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STATE OF NEW YORK -BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION N OTICE 










Nelson Calix 94A5929 
Fishkill Correctional Facility 
Box 1245 ' 
Beacon, New York 12508 
07-035-19 B 
June 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 12 months. 
Berliner, Smith, Demosthenes 
Appellant's Brief received July 30, 20 19 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
e undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
/ 
_ Affirmed _ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview - Modified to----
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
r easons for the Parole Board 's determination must be annexed. hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 1 /i&/d.o AJI . . 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
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   Appellant challenges the June 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 
12-month hold. Appellant’s instant offense involved him strangling and repeatedly hitting the 
victim in the head, causing her death. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is 
arbitrary and capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to 
consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the decision is based upon 
erroneous information in that the DA letters were written for his initial interview, and not for any 
reappearance interviews. 3) the decision is based upon old disciplinary matters. 4) the Board failed 
to list any factors in support of the statutory standard cited. 5) the decision lacks detail. 6) no 
aggravating factors exist. 7) the decision illegally resentenced him. 8) inmates with far worse 
records are being released. 9) the Board has a policy against inmates whose victims are female. 
10) the Commissioner’s Worksheets from both 2018 and 2019 show the decision was 
predetermined. 11) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, 
and the 2017 regulations, in that the Case Plan and COMPAS were ignored, the laws are now 
rehabilitation based, and the departure from the COMPAS was void. 
 
      Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability 
that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that 
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
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   Although the Board placed great emphasis on the violent nature of the crime, it was not required 
to discuss or give equal weight to each statutory factor.  Matter of Wise v. State Div. of Parole, 54 
A.D.3d 463, 464, 862 N.Y.S.2d 644, 645 (3d Dept. 2008).     
 
    Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, the record reflects it also considered other 
appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered.  Matter 
of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018). 
Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, it was free to do so given all factors need not 
be given equal weight.  Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 
156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017);  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 
A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
   The Board may place greater weight on an inmate’s disciplinary record even though infractions 
were incurred earlier in the inmate’s incarceration.  Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 
1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013) (while improved since last interview, concern with 
multiple violations accumulated before 2007); Matter of Warmus v. New York State Dep’t of 
Corrs. & Cmty. Supervision, Index No. 7516-17, Decision, Order & Judgment dated Sept. 10, 
2018 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co.) (O’Connor, A.S.C.J.).   
   The Board may consider a district attorney’s recommendation to deny parole.  Matter of 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); 
Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of Walker 
v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter of Lynch 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981). That all letters 
were submitted by a prior District Attorney is of no importance. 
   An inmate’s willingness to admit to the facts of the crime and consideration of activities following 
arrest and prior to confinement are factors within the scope of the statute.  Matter of Hamilton v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1274, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 720 (3d Dept. 2014) (pattern 
of lies and refusal to cooperate with law enforcement). The Board may place particular emphasis on 
the inmate’s troubling course of conduct both during and after the commission of the instant 
offenses. Jones v New York State Board of Parole, 175 A.D.3d 1652, 108 N.Y.S.3d 505 (3d Dept. 
2019). 
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   The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Espinal v. New 
York Bd. of Parole, 2019 NY Slip Op 04080, 2019 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4057 (3d Dept. May 23, 
2019) (COMPAS instrument yielded mixed results); Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 
50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed results including substance 
abuse relevant given use before crime); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 
508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for substance abuse alcohol related 
crimes); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 
(3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family support), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 
57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).  The Board is not required to give the COMPAS and case plan greater 
weight than the other statutory factors.  Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 
N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); accord Matter of Lewis v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 
726 (3d Dept. 2017). 
   The Board may place greater weight on the nature of the crime without the existence of any 
aggravating factors.  Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 
N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). 
     There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-
finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 
2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 
957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal 
policies in fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 
(2000). There is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense.  
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 
2000). Nor was any penal philosophy discussed. Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption 
that the Board complied with its duty.  See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 
A.D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dept. 1985).  
   Any claim that the decision is predetermined based upon the Commissioner’s Worksheet is invalid. 
The inmate has failed to demonstrate that the use of the worksheet by the interviewing Board 
members reflected a predetermined decision to deny him release to parole.  See Duffy v. Evans et 
al.,  2013 WL 3491119 (S.D.N.Y.)(Furman, U.S.D.J.).  
      That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i 
(2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.”  Matter 
of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 
2016) (citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d 
Dept. 2012).  The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute.  
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Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 
727 (2d Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 
857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that 
denied release as “contrary to the best interest of the community”); Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 
A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011) (Board provided adequate statutory rationale). 
   The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
   Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
   Appellant contends that the Board’s decision is unlawful because it treats inmates differently 
where the victim is female.  In support, he cites a handful of inmates whom he alleges “have to 
serve way past the minimum.”  However, each application for parole release is considered on its 
own individual merits to arrive at a discretionary determination.  Baker v. McCall, 543 F. Supp. 498, 
501 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1982); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 
17, 22, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124-25 (1st Dept. 2007).  There can be a number of reasons for a parole 
denial in any given case.  In addition, parole denial in the cited cases does not in and of itself establish 
different treatment from inmates with male victims.  Petitioner’s speculation concerning his own 
case is unsupported.  Matter of Marcelin v. Travis, 262 A.D.2d 836, 837, 693 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641 
(3d Dept. 1999) (rejecting speculative claim of bias based on victims’ gender); cf. Matter of 
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Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 95 N.Y.2d 
769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000).   
   As for other inmates, there is no entitlement to parole based upon comparison with the particulars 
of other applicants. Rather, each case is sui generis, and the Board may give each case a unique 
weighted value. Phillips v Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dept. 2007). 
   Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079. An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and 
without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d 
Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason 
or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  Siao-Paul 
v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Hanna v New York State Board of Parole, 
169 A.D.3d 503, 92 N.Y.S.3d 621 (1st Dept. 2019). 
   The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was affected by a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). 
   In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, 
it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 
914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
       Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive 
Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d 
Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 
133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law 
amendments have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017. 
   Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do 
not represent a forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for 
release decisions.  This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, 
considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive 
change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process.  In 
2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Calix, Nelson DIN: 94-A-5929  
Facility: Fishkill CF AC No.:  07-035-19 B 
    
Findings: (Page 6 of 6) 
 
principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4).  
The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane 
v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of 
Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 
985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never 
intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information 
from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 
amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of 
each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense.  Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The amendments 
also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when 
deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS 
instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  
Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the 
statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied.  
See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d 
Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 
2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017). 
 
   The Board cited a negative COMPAS score in the decision. Thus, the Board did not depart from 
the COMPAS. The decision is consistent with amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as there is no 
departure to explain.  That is, the Board’s decision was not impacted by a departure from a scale 
within the assessment.   Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.   In fact, the Board cited 
the COMPAS instrument in its denial and reasonably indicated concern about the “probable” risk 
for reentry substance abuse in view of Petitioner’s history including before the instant offense. 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
